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I.

INTRODUCTION: KOPPELMAN’S “PURITAN MISTAKE”

In his essay, Religious Liberty as Liberty, Douglas Laycock cautioned
against what he would later dub “the Puritan mistake,” 1 which is the
mistake, as he put it, of looking at whether religion is a good (or bad) thing
rather than seeing religious liberty as “first and foremost a guarantee of
liberty.” 2 We should not, Laycock warned, let our understanding of the
religion clauses be driven by what we think, substantively, about the value

* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School,
2007; M.A., Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Chicago, 2004. I am grateful to Micah
Schwartzman, John Inazu, William Baude, Christopher Lund, Michael McConnell, Andrew
Koppelman, and Christopher Bradley for comments and conversations on earlier drafts. Thanks to
Chris Jones and Sam Dickhut for their usual excellent research help. All errors are my own. This is
a response to Andrew Koppelman’s And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115 (2013), and a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February
2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence
Whom?.
1. Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 353
(1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty]; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty: Not
for Religion or Against Religion, but for Individual Choice, UT LAW, Spring 2004, at 42, available
at http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/wp/wp-content/uploads/magazine/archive/utlaw_spring04.pdf.
2. Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 313.
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of religion. 3 It should be driven, instead, by an interest in protecting the
freedom of religion, and not religion per se. 4
Although Andy Koppelman positions himself in much the same
conceptual space as Laycock, I think he makes (and would probably admit to
making) a version of the “Puritan mistake.” Koppelman says that he is
interested in avoiding the extreme of radical secularism that favors “the
complete eradication of religion from public life” but also the extreme of
religious traditionalism, which sees nothing wrong with “frank endorsement
of religious propositions.” 5
Koppelman, like Laycock, wants to find a way between these two
extremes. But instead of rejecting the traditionalist view outright,
Koppelman instead insists that religion is a good thing (this is the Puritan
mistake), but—partly in a bid to appease the secularists—that religion ought
to be defined at a very high level of abstraction. 6 We can affirm, in
Koppelman’s phrase, “religion in general,” but not any religion in
particular. 7 In short, the Puritan mistake was, in a way, a particularly
Puritan mistake; the Puritans made the error of supporting religious freedom
only for Puritans. 8 They should have instead supported “religion in
general.”
It’s a neat trick, if it works: Koppelman can have his cake and eat it too.
He defend the value of religion without defending the value of any religion
in particular. And his solution is neat on another level as well, because it
defends a practical answer to a theoretical puzzle. The theoretical puzzle is:
How can the state possibly support religion, even give it special protection,
but remain neutral? The practical answer Koppelman offers is simply to
look at American practice and see what we have done. 9 It seems impossible
that a state could promote religion and be neutral, but in America we have
done it, surprisingly. In practice we have done what seems to be impossible
in theory.
As a theorist, I find this result unsatisfying and more than a little
depressing, and I find myself wanting to put pressure on Koppelman from
both sides. I want to say, with the radical secularist, that Koppelman’s
abstract “religion in general” is too much like religion to be neutral; but I
also want to say, with the religious traditionalist, that religion in general may

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39
PEPP. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2013) [hereinafter Koppelman, Religious Neutrality].
7. Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 90 (2002); see also Koppelman,
Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126.
8. Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 353.
9. See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1117–32.
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not capture perfectly what many (or most) of us mean by religion. So I want
to try putting Koppelman between the traditionalist and the secularist—
between Scalia and Rawls, as it were—and see where we end up.
II. KOPPELMAN’S “MASTER CONCEPT”: THE FLUIDITY OF NEUTRALITY
Koppelman’s “master concept,” the one which inspires the new book he
has been working on for many years, is that neutrality is not a fixed thing
which we can define once and for all, but is actually a fluid concept. 10 More
particularly, there are various levels of neutrality, and before we dismiss the
idea of neutrality tout court we have to grapple with the idea that neutrality
as something less than absolute neutrality might be a very useful concept.
For instance, someone could like baseball, but be neutral about whether
there should be a designated hitter or not. Or (a little closer to our topic)
someone could favor state support of the arts, but not support any particular
type of art: the state could fund dance, or music, or impressionist paintings,
or abstract paintings. Or a state could promote religious belief, but not any
particular religious belief; it could promote “religion in general.”
“Religion in general” is also an important concept for Koppelman: it
may go hand-in-hand with the fluidity of neutrality as his key concept. The
two, of course, are importantly related, because Koppelman believes that
religion in general is the appropriately “neutral” level at which we should
support religion. The state remains neutral on religion so long as it only
backs “religion in general,” and not anything more or less abstract than that.
As Koppelman is well aware, one might argue that state support for
religion in general, in fact, is the wrong level of neutrality. For religion in
general is at least one level of abstraction above the idea that the state can
support monotheistic religion and not just religion in general. And one
might think that support for a generic monotheism is the right level of
neutrality for America. In fact, Justice Scalia, as Koppelman notes, has
endorsed this view in at least one opinion; 11 although he has said conflicting
things in other opinions. 12 Justice Story may have also held such a view,
indeed, perhaps an even narrower one: that Christianity could receive special
protection and encouragement from the state, but not any one particular

10. See id. at 1127; see also Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633
(2004) (discussing this theory at length).
11. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
12. Id. at 1127 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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sect. 13 This is, we might say, two levels below Koppelman’s favored level
of religious neutrality. Scalia might even face a powerful objection from
Story that he has made his concept of religion too abstract.
It is important to see, and I think that Koppelman would concede, that
Scalia’s and Story’s views are also varieties of religious neutrality. Scalia is
neutral as to the monotheistic religions, 14 and Story is neutral as to the
various sects of Christianity. 15 But Koppelman rejects both of these views
because they do not adequately capture the right kind of neutrality. He says
that they are not abstract enough, even though they might have been the
right kind of neutrality at earlier stages in our nation’s history (as
Koppelman might also grant). 16
So the innovation of the fluidity of neutrality can only get us so far,
because the real debate will not be whether any of these conceptions are
“neutral,” because all of them can be considered as varieties of neutrality.
You cannot just pound your fist on the table and say your conception is
“more neutral” than all the others. This is one main reason that I think it is
probably advisable to give up on neutrality as a useful concept, because the
real work, the work that goes into getting your conception to be accepted as
the “neutral” one, goes on elsewhere. The real question is not whether we
should be neutral at all, but what level of neutrality we should aspire to. But
how do we answer this question?
III. CAN WE FIND THE RIGHT LEVEL OF NEUTRALITY?
As I see it, there are two general ways of deciding which level of
neutrality is appropriate—that neutrality means religion in general, say,
rather than neutrality about monotheism or neutrality about Christianity. 17
The first way is to look at existing societal consensus. The correct level of
neutrality will be the one where the most people agree. If most people agree
that the state can support “religion in general” then that is neutral, or at least
neutral enough. The second way is through theory. We might provide some
more abstract theoretical method for determining what kind of state support
for religion (if any) would be permitted. One such method would be John
Rawls’s idea that we can only justify the state’s use of its coercive power if

13. Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 323–24; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 701 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (stating that the
real object of the Establishment Clause was “to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects”).
14. See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126.
15. 1 STORY, supra note 13, at 701.
16. See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1125–26.
17. Id. at 1127; McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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it is based on reasons that no person could reasonably reject. 18 I consider
these two methods in turn.
A. Social Consensus?
If the standard for neutrality is societal consensus or “the convergence
of a contingent set of actual views,” 19 then how are we to determine this
consensus? By poll? If so, then Scalia may be closer to what is “neutral”
than Koppelman is. Scalia notes that monotheists make up nearly ninetyeight percent of those practicing a religion in America. 20 This, of course,
does not say what Americans think about what religions should be protected
or (to phrase the question in a more accurate way) what they think is
religion, and thus worth protecting. And this is a poll only of believers, and
so it may be somewhat biased, although it seems fair to include only selfascribed religious believers in the category of the religious.
More to the point, if there was a poll asking whether Americans thought
the state should protect religion in general, it is hard to say what the results
would be or what most Americans take religion to be. Would they agree that
atheism is a religion? Koppelman says that we know what religion is when
we see it; 21 then again, who are “we”? I am not so sure, or not as sure as
Koppelman, that ceremonial deism is revanchist, rather than an attempt to
express contemporary attitudes about majority religious belief; deism may
be the tip of a more substantial iceberg, not simply the fragments of a dying
(sub)culture. 22
In a way, this is not where I want to press Koppelman, although it is
close to it. Koppelman rejects Scalia’s understanding of neutrality, saying
that it “does not work, because it discriminates among religions;” 23 and
later, he says that Scalia does “not appreciate the fluidity of neutrality.” 24
But Scalia might insist that of course he does, he just understands the level
of neutrality required by the “convergence of a contingent set of [our] actual

18. Rawls calls this the “liberal principle of legitimacy.” See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 136–37 (2005).
19. See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126.
20. Id. at 1127; McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
21. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1121–22.
22. See also Richard W. Garnett, Neutrality and the Good of Religious Freedom: An Appreciative
Response to Professor Koppelman, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1149 (2013).
23. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1127 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
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views” to be different than Koppelman does. 25 This again shows that
invocations of the fluidity of neutrality are just as likely to start disputes as
to settle them.
If Koppelman says that Scalia (or at least a suitably theorized version of
Scalia 26) is wrong about the correct level of neutrality as an empirical matter,
he has to explain more about how we understand how to fix that level, and
why Scalia is wrong about what “most people” believe, or why what “most
people” believe isn’t enough for neutrality. Does there have to be
unanimity? If there does, then surely there isn’t unanimity about “religion in
general” either, as I elaborate below. Further, Scalia does not rest his
argument about consensus merely on polling data alone: he says that support
for monotheism in general is based in America’s history and tradition, as
well as in the text of the Constitution. 27
Saying Scalia is wrong because his view “discriminates” against
religions does not sound like Koppelman is merely accusing Scalia of
miscounting noses, or getting our history wrong. Rather, Scalia makes
something akin to a conceptual mistake, by defining what religion is too
narrowly. His understanding of religion as monotheism may reflect a
consensus of sorts; in fact, Scalia may be right about what our actual
consensus about religion is. But Scalia’s understanding of that consensus
might not provide us with the best characterization of our existing practices,
which would lead us (Koppelman intimates) to a broader definition of
“religion.”
But to speak of the “best characterization” of our views puts us beyond
the actual convergence of our points of view: it represents a step toward
theory. We look at our actual views, and reflect on what is the best
characterization of them: something which builds on, but is not reducible to
what our actual views are. If Scalia gets his characterization wrong, then we
need a theory to say where he goes wrong: we can’t just point to the fact that
he excludes some beliefs that some would call religious. 28 As the old saying
goes, it takes a theory to beat a theory. 29

25. Id. at 1126.
26. I am not much interested, in this particular essay, in getting the actual Scalia right.
27. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Scalia, after all, could claim that Koppelman’s definition includes some beliefs that should
not be interpreted as religious beliefs.
29. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 053: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le_1.html (last modified June
19, 2011).
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B. Theory?
This brings me to the second answer that we might give to the question
of how to specify the right level of neutrality, which is that we decide what
the right level of neutrality is as a matter of theory and not (merely) as a
matter of practice or social consensus. Koppelman briefly discusses Rawls
in this light, and I follow him in this. 30 Koppelman, I take it, would agree
that promotion of monotheism, as opposed to religion in general, might be
“reasonably rejected” by those who have nontheistic religious beliefs. 31 But
if this is true, then we also have to ask: could some reasonably reject the idea
that religion in general is good, and deserves protection?
The answer to this, I think, is clearly yes. Some undoubtedly think
religion (in general, or in a specific instantiation) is bad and ought to be
abolished. 32 Certainly as a theoretical matter, the special protection of
religion is, at the very least, something upon which reasonable people can
disagree.
More directly, some people might reasonably reject that religion can be
promoted or privileged; they might even say that about “religion in general,”
and they surely will say it about exemptions to religious belief. Some will
reject religious exemptions across the board; are they not just mistaken but
unreasonably so? And are they being unreasonable if their only ground for
rejecting the special treatment of religion is simply because it is unfair to
favor religion in general over other modes of belief or ways or life? If they
think that protection for religion in general won’t work “because it
discriminates”? 33 I am hard-pressed to see how they would be unreasonable
in claiming this. Surely they can say that promotion or protection of religion
in general is controversial just as much as nontheistic religious believers can
(rightly) assert that promotion of monotheism is controversial.
Koppelman might reply to the atheist’s objection by saying that the
atheist too might be a proponent of a “religion in general.” But if even the
atheist counts as adhering to a variant of “religion in general” 34 then surely
we have lost any firm grasp of what is distinctive about the good of religion,

30.
31.
32.

Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1124–26.
Again, I take the idea of reasonable rejection from Rawls.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS
EVERYTHING (2007).
33. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1127.
34. Or even if we can coherently conceive of the atheist as believing something rather than just
not believing in something (i.e. in God or the sacred).
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and even the good of religion in general. 35 There ends up being no real light
between “religion in general” and what Rawls would call a “comprehensive
doctrine,” or a view of the world that can be religious, philosophical, or
moral. 36 The route of theory gives Koppelman no real support for his
understanding of “religion in general,” anymore than the route of social
consensus did.
Can there be a third way?
IV. CONCLUSION: GIVING UP ON NEUTRALITY
Koppelman, in his contribution to this issue, 37 can be a little vague
(perhaps deliberately so) about the value of religion in general and how
religion has a distinct value over other conceptions of the good. 38 He says in
one place that religion gives us hope, 39 but so do many other things. 40 What
he means to say, or should mean to say, is that religion gives us a special
kind of hope, a hope that transcends the mundane. This is a type of good
that cannot be captured by secular theories: it suggests that no matter the
appearances, the world, as such, is just, or at least tends towards justice. I do
not think a secular theory can give any sense to this type of hope—what we
might call a hope in the transcendent. 41
If religion is a good, it is (as Koppelman observes elsewhere 42) a very
distinct kind of good and not simply the sum total of all good religiouslyinspired acts and attitudes. And if religion is a good, a real good, then it is
doubtless a very important good, worthy of protection. Moreover, if the
state promotes this good, it is not simply saying that many people believe
religion is a good and so we protect it (people believe all sorts of things are
good, but not all of them get or deserve protection) or that the people who
believe religion are particularly intense about it (again, people are intense

35. It is relevant that in the quote that gives Koppelman’s essay its title, Eisenhower was talking
about not caring about what religion people had; he did not say that it was important that people
believe something, and it did not matter what it was. Eisenhower, in his own way, was trying to pick
out the uniqueness of religion.
36. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 37; see also Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Isn’t Special?,
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1992090.
37. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6.
38. Id. at 1137; see also Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571 [hereinafter Koppelman, Is It Fair?].
39. Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1130–31.
40

America’s past history of overcoming division and discord may
give us hope, the example of great men and women may give us
hope, and so on.
41.
42.
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about all sorts of things, but not all of them get or deserve protection);
rather, it is saying that religion is good, period. Any sound defense of
religious liberty will, I think, make Laycock’s “Puritan mistake” at some
level. Maybe not necessarily at the level the Puritans made it, but at some
level.
I do not think, in articulating and ultimately defending this good, we are
helped by saying that we are promoting religion (even religion in general) in
a neutral way. It defers the problem without addressing it, because it does
not get us around the implications of making the Puritan mistake. Some will
legitimately object that any promotion of religion is nonneutral, even at a
very high level of abstraction. They are right, I think, to say that there is no
sound reason to stop at that level of abstraction, if we are speaking solely in
terms of neutrality. The Rawlsians can say, just as Koppelman says to
Scalia, that anything less than their level of neutrality “discriminates.”
We are better off, I think, giving up on neutrality as a term of art and
simply arguing directly in terms of religion’s distinct value: we protect
religion not because we are being neutral, but because of the value of
religion as such. 43 Those who deny that religion has any distinct value will
have to say that religion is not relevantly different from believing anything
else. At the limit, they may say that religion does more harm than good, or
that religion is simply false. Those who believe in the value of religious
liberty qua religious liberty will have to have answers to these questions.
This is the debate that the Enlightenment, in part, was about, and I do not
think that there is any way we can get around it by talking about neutrality.
There is no muddling through it, not in theory, and not in practice either.

43. For further elaboration of this point, see Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First
Amendment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 257 (2008).
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